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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
2	DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS	
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4	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	
5		
6	vs.) No. 1:16-cr-10134-DPW	
7	DAVID TKHILAISHVILI AND)	
8	JAMBULAT TKHILAISHVILI,))	
9	Defendants.	
10	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS P. WOODLOCK	
11		
12	CONDITION OF CHARGING HEADING	
13	CONTINUATION OF SENTENCING HEARING	
14		
15	John Jaganh Maaklay United States Counthouse	
16	John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse Courtroom No. 1	
17	One Courthouse Way Boston, MA 02210 Tuesday, December 19, 2017 10:10 a.m.	
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21	Brenda K. Hancock, RMR, CRR	
22	Official Court Reporter John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse	
23	One Courthouse Way Boston, MA 02210 (617)439-3214	
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1 (The following proceedings were held in open court before the Honorable Douglas P. Woodlock, United States 2. District Judge, United States District Court, District of 3 4 Massachusetts, at the John J. Moakley United States Courthouse, 5 One Courthouse Way, Courtroom 1, Boston, Massachusetts, on 6 Tuesday, December 19, 2017): THE CLERK: All rise. 7 (The Honorable Court entered the courtroom at 10:10 a.m.) 8 THE CLERK: This Honorable Court is now in session. 9 10 Please be seated. Criminal Action Number 16-10134, United 11 States v. Tkhilaishvili. 12 THE CLERK: Mister Interpreter, please raise your 13 right hand. 14 (Interpreter duly sworn by the clerk) 15 THE CLERK: Please be seated. 16 THE COURT: Well, I want to see if I can get this back on track a bit as a result of the supplemental Rule 29 motion, 17 18 and I quess I have to ask Mr. Cruz why it wasn't raised at an 19 earlier stage. 20 MR. CRUZ: Your Honor, this was an issue that was 21 discussed between myself and David Tkhilaishvili sometime after 22 the jury was released and the verdict entered. I had discussed 23 with Mr. Tkhilaishvili the pros and cons of raising the issue at that point in time and also looked into it further to see if 24

it, quite frankly, had any merit. I brought it before the

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Court's attention because, upon review of the case record or the trial record, it became apparent to me that HMG was a separate business entity.

THE COURT: Well, but what is the con of raising it, and why it wouldn't have been clearer earlier?

MR. CRUZ: Quite frankly, your Honor, because I didn't spot that issue, and if Mr. Tkhilaishvili did and brought it to my attention I felt I was obligated at least to bring it to the Court's attention if I thought that it had some merit.

THE COURT: So, Ms. Kaplan, I guess the issue for me is this; that this goes to the question of whether the statute itself applies, and while I understand Rule 29 to be designed to encourage prompt framing of the issues here or in any criminal case, I do not know why as a practical matter I should not address it at this stage. By ruling adversely to the defendant, it becomes an issue framed for appeal. You have made clear your view that it is untimely. That is one of your grounds but not the only ground. If I rule favorably to the defendant, then the issue is teed up for the Court of Appeals to take up if the Government chooses to cross-appeal with respect to it.

I am not sure I see, except a kind of, I will call it a wooden adherence to a time frame, a reason not to take it up here. If it were some other kind of issue that did not go right to the core of whether or not federal jurisdiction is

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proper here I might feel differently about it, but this goes to the core of it, I think.

If there is anything else you want to say, I think you know where I am going, but if there is something I am missing there on that aspect of it, I would like to know.

MS. KAPLAN: No, I don't think so, your Honor, and that's why I did address it in the Government's response and I addressed the merits.

THE COURT: Right. So, let me go to the merits of this. Why isn't it the case that with respect to Count Four that this is embezzlement but it is not federal embezzlement, it is embezzlement from a separate entity. A separate entity has control of these funds. The funds may have a purpose of serving the health care institution that is within the scope of the federal statute, but I have some difficulty, now that it has been framed.

Thinking about this as anything other than state fraud or state embezzlement and nothing else. So, let me understand that.

MS. KAPLAN: I think, your Honor, because I think what strikes me, your Honor, is that this defendant set up these accounts. This isn't somebody who took a draw from an account that he didn't realize was a health care benefit program. He knew that all of the money in the HMG account came from the Allied Health account, which was clearly monies that were

earmarked as monies of a health care benefit program.

THE COURT: But were they monies of a health care benefit program? As a practical matter, could the health care benefit program -- I understand that maybe I should not say, "As a practical matter," I should say as a structural matter the monies of the health care benefit program couldn't force HMG to give it back to them, could they, the \$2,000?

MS. KAPLAN: Well, I think they could.

THE COURT: How?

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MS. KAPLAN: I think that what's also important is that the transaction occurred -- was at the direction of David Tkhilaishvili. It happened on the same day. He realized that there wasn't enough money in the HMG account, because it was solely funded by the Allied Health account, so he took the money. He caused the money, which were health care benefit program monies from the Allied Health account, to be put into the HMG account, to then be put into the payroll account. So, he knew that those monies were monies that he was taking from Allied Health Care, which was a health care benefit program, and he purposely put them in the HMG account to go into the payroll account.

THE COURT: Is the movement of the funds into the HMG account itself fraud? I say "fraud." I mean embezzlement.

MS. KAPLAN: Yes.

THE COURT: Because that is what is charged here. HMG

1 is there to receive monies from --

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MS. KAPLAN: Allied Health.

THE COURT: -- Allied Health for its payroll. He is in a position to make that choice. It's a two-stage process. I understand that. The question is whether or not the formalities of separate corporate entities make a difference here. And so, I will break it up into two parts; the first part being a person with authority to make the transfer, which he had, I believe --

MS. KAPLAN: Yes.

THE COURT: -- orders the transfer to be made. If the monies from HMG had been used for appropriate payroll purposes, not the one that actually took place, but appropriate payroll services, that wouldn't be embezzlement, right?

MS. KAPLAN: Correct.

THE COURT: So, the point of embezzlement, the mode of embezzlement is with H M G paying out here.

MS. KAPLAN: Correct.

THE COURT: And that seems to me to be state court embezzlement.

MS. KAPLAN: Well, no. I think the embezzlement comes when he has Allied Health transfer the monies into the HMG account into the payroll account, because he knows what he's doing. He knows that the monies that he's transferring from Allied Health are monies that are appropriated from a health

care benefit program.

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THE COURT: But that is why I asked the question earlier of assume that he does make the transfer. Assume that the transfer, just for purposes at the time of transfer it could equally be used for his special use or for a general payroll, which is the appropriate use under these circumstances for whoever does work for Allied Health.

MS. KAPLAN: Correct.

THE COURT: So, it is the payout from HMG that is the embezzlement, and it is no longer within the scope of Allied Health. I guess that is my concern here. There is a reason for the formalities to be observed. The federal criminal jurisdiction does not extend generally to all sorts of embezzlement that is associated with health care; it deals with the particular entities themselves, I think. And so, that is why I am, now focused on it, a bit puzzled by how to treat this. Not really puzzled, but I think that it properly has to be said that this particular transaction itself is not a federal criminal violation.

MS. KAPLAN: Well, I guess I don't agree. I think that the embezzlement occurs when he causes the money to be taken out of Allied Health. It's all in one transaction. And he takes that money and has it put into --

THE COURT: That is not quite what is charged, is it?
What is charged is the payment to him. You see, if what were

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      charged were embezzlement by taking money out of Allied Health
      and putting it into the health care, whatever it is called
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      again, HMG, if that were charged that would be a different
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      issue, because that is taking the money and putting it in HMG;
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      but what is charged, as I recall, is the transfer from HMG to
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      him.
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               MS. KAPLAN: I'd have to look at the indictment, but I
      think it is from a health care benefit program.
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      embezzlement --
               THE COURT: No. I think it talks about that
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      transaction out to him, but let me go back to the --
               MS. KAPLAN: I don't have the indictment.
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               THE COURT: -- the indictment here.
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                                    (Pause)
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                            I'm sorry. I don't have the indictment.
               MS. KAPLAN:
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               THE COURT: Okay. So, let me see if I can pull it up.
                            I think the language read exactly the
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      same way between Counts Three and Four.
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               THE COURT:
                           Right, but the transaction is different.
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                                    (Pause)
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               THE COURT: Yes, I guess you are right, it is
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      capacious enough to deal with this. But let's, then, go to the
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      question whether there is a charge here. Let me just work
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      through it. There is a charge here that is cognizable by the
      Federal Criminal Code, and it is the decision by
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1 Mr. Tkhilaishvili to transfer from -- take the money out of Allied Health and put it into the account in HMG --2. MS. KAPLAN: Correct. 3 4 THE COURT: -- not the payment from HMG to him. 5 MS. KAPLAN: Correct. And they stipulated at trial 6 that Allied Health was a health care benefit program. 7 THE COURT: So, let me get back to this issue at trial. 8 9 Assume, Mr. Cruz, that someone, Mr. Tkhilaishvili, 10 takes money out of Allied Health and puts into the payroll 11 account --12 MR. CRUZ: Yes, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: -- as the first step in a scheme to get 14 the money to him personally. Why isn't that covered? 15 MR. CRUZ: Your Honor, I think the answer to that lies 16 in the way that the business structure was set up for both 17 Allied Health and HMG, which is that Mr. Tkhilaishvili, as the Chief Operating Officer, had the ability or authorization from 18 19 Mr. Torosyan and the other co-owners of the business to 20 transfer money from one account, that being Allied Health, to 21 HMG. THE COURT: Could he do that with fraudulent intent? 22 23 MR. CRUZ: Well, your Honor, I guess that is 24 something --25 THE COURT: See, here is the issue or one of the

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issues: There are these formalities. The formalities should be observed. On the other hand, if someone is directing all of this with a view toward extracting money from Allied Health for ultimately his own personal benefit and the first step of that is to exploit and manipulate these formalities by transferring it into another entity and then the other entity is going to pay him, I am not sure why that should not be within the scope of 669. There is a transfer that can be treated as embezzlement out of Allied Health. It would have to be out of Allied Health, from my perspective, but it is a transfer out of Allied Health.

MR. CRUZ: Yes, your Honor. And I think that's a question of what the evidence supports in terms of Mr. Tkhilaishvili's intent with regard to that transfer of money, because, as I pointed out in the attachment with Granite payroll records that were relevant to this transaction, not only was Mr. Tkhilaishvili paid out at that point in November, but several other employees of HMG were paid out, and with that I guess the question is --

THE COURT: Well, but if it had been them, that is different, but that is not what was alleged here. It is the \$2,000 payment out --

MR. CRUZ: Correct.

THE COURT: -- which ended up in Mr. Tkhilaishvili's hands, right?

MR. CRUZ: Yes. But I guess the point I am trying to make is that the transfer of money for payroll purposes generally was authorized, and then if he chooses to pay himself \$2,000 out of a separate account for HMG I agree with what the Court's saying, that could be seen as fraudulent with regard to HMG.

THE COURT: So, where else could I have gotten it wrong? Did I charge the jury improperly with respect to this? I don't think so. I think it was a general charge on this. Is there evidence from which a jury could find that this two-step transaction was embezzlement? I think so. Now, things to argue the other way say, "Well, he just tried to provide a mechanism or conduit for payment, which is the role of HMG, to pay payroll."

MS. KAPLAN: Your Honor, could I just add one fact that also came out at trial, which is that the clinic's, Allied Health Clinic's Operating Agreement provided that no member was permitted to write checks in excess of \$1,000 without all of the members' approval? So, he wasn't actually authorized to be transferring this money.

THE COURT: That itself wouldn't be embezzlement. It has to be part of a chain that led to an embezzlement by him. That is to say, if he had done that without authorization -- I will take your point about a \$1,000 cap on authorization -- that I don't think would have been an embezzlement.

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MS. KAPLAN: No. It's just another factor that went in, and I think Victor Torosyan testified that he had not given Mr. Tkhilaishvili the authorization to take that money. So, it's just another factor that goes into the defendant's intent, I suppose.

THE COURT: Well, I am going to deny the Supplemental Motion for Judgment of Acquittal focused specifically on Count Four here. It is a multiple-stage process that Mr. Tkhilaishvili engaged in, but the initial transfer was one out of a health care benefit program with a view toward embezzling from that program itself. So, I decline to grant a judgment of acquittal on that count.

Now, does that substantively deal with all of the outstanding issues? There is a question of forfeiture, but I think that now is taken up by this; that is, there is a money judgment forfeiture that flows from this.

MR. CRUZ: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: There is, in addition, Mr. Torosyan's various filings claiming some sort of entitlement to particular monies. They are pretty much barebones, and I just want to be sure I have dealt with the question of restitution on this.

Ms. Kaplan, does the \$3,500 become restitution too, or is it forfeiture or what?

MS. KAPLAN: I think it probably will become restitution, your Honor. I think the additional monies that

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      Mr. Torosyan has requested, I don't think that they are a basis
      for restitution, frankly.
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               THE COURT: Let me just be sure I've got them out
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      here.
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               MS. KAPLAN: It's the amount of monies that he put
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      into the clinic and never got back.
               THE COURT: Right. He asked for $20,000 for
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      December 2014 to January 2015 due to the defendant's actions.
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      I do not see that as restitutionary in this setting.
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               MS. KAPLAN: I don't either.
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               THE COURT: Then he asked for $11,000 on August 2015.
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      Again, I am not sure I see that as restitution. I guess I
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      don't see the $3,500 as restitution to him personally. It's
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      restitution to --
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               MS. KAPLAN: Well, it would be restitution to the
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      clinic.
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               THE COURT: -- the clinic.
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               MS. KAPLAN: Yes.
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               THE COURT: Yes. Okay. So, I think I am simply going
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      to make that restitution in addition to forfeiture as well.
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               MR. CRUZ: Yes, your Honor. And, for the record, I
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      just want to note my objection to the Court's denial of the
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      supplemental Rule 29 motion, and for purposes of the record I
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would state that the 3,500 should be parsed down to 1,500 if

the Court were to divorce the 2,000 that is the subject of the

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      supplemental Rule 29 from the equation.
               THE COURT: Right. I would reformulate, obviously,
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      the money judgment to include only $1,500 forward from Count
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      Three, if I allowed it, but, of course, I am not going to.
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               MR. CRUZ: Thank you.
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               THE COURT: So, that is where it stands now for those
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      purposes.
               So, are there any other issues that we need to take up
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      before going to the actual question of sentencing?
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               MS. KAPLAN: So, I just want to make sure. It sounds
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      like you have the letter from Victor Torosyan. Do you also
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      have the letter from his wife?
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               THE COURT: Yes, I do.
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               MS. KAPLAN: Okay.
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               THE COURT: The letter from Mr. Torosyan, apart from
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      claiming money, was July 8th, and the letter from Mrs. Torosyan
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      does not bear a date, but I think it came in about
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      October 16th. Right?
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               MS. KAPLAN: Yes.
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               THE COURT: Anything else that we need to take up,
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      then?
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               MR. CRUZ: Your Honor, just to be clear for the
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      record, there was an overarching Rule 29 motion for Counts
      Three and Four.
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               THE COURT: Right.
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MR. CRUZ: That, I believe, argument is precluded to the extent there was a stipulation.

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. CRUZ: What I would state to the Court is that the stipulation was entered into based upon the belief that the Department of Public Health certification received by the clinic was sufficient to qualify Allied Health as a health care benefits program under the statute.

THE COURT: Well, there are two parts to that. There also was a *nunc pro tunc* certification by the federal authorities, as I recall.

MR. CRUZ: Yes, your Honor, and it didn't become apparent until the course of the trial that there was lack of evidence, I would suggest, regarding treatments being actually made to patients during the relevant time period and requests for reimbursement from these insurance carriers, which I think arguably was the motivation to file the Rule 29s, because that, I think, is the more crucial issue, whether monies were received for services rendered from these insurance carriers. But I just want to state that for the record.

THE COURT: Okay. I think I understand the issue. My view is that the certification puts this entity into a position of being subject to the protection of the Federal Criminal Code, and the nunc pro tunc quality of it indicates when that was, and it is well before these transactions.

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MS. KAPLAN: There is one issue, your Honor, and I'm not sure that this is the time in what you are about to do next, but I thought I would bring it to the Court's attention. Since we last were before you, it has come to the Government's attention that David Tkhilaishvili has been providing information to an inmate or other inmates about Victor Torosyan such that the Watertown Police Department where Mr. Torosyan lives has now been put on notice. I don't know what type of investigation they have commenced. But we have seen the information that Mr. Tkhilaishvili has provided, and it's all the same stuff that came out at trial. So, again, I'm just bringing it to your attention.

THE COURT: Well, I do not know what I should do about that. If you are saying I should consider post-verdict call it retaliatory action against Mr. Torosyan as part of an enhancement as to Mr. Tkhilaishvili, I would like to, of course, hear from Mr. Cruz. That may just simply open up an additional dimension to this. It is also, I suppose, independently prosecutable as obstruction of justice if all of the elements are met. I think my inclination at this stage is to say I am simply not going to consider that, if it's true, because it will simply extend this sentencing process here, and it is sufficiently divorced from the trial itself and the relevant conduct at the trial that I think it is improvident to review it.

1 MS. KAPLAN: Okay.

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MR. CRUZ: And for the record, your Honor, this is the first that I have heard of this, so I wouldn't be prepared to respond, in any event.

THE COURT: Right. Well, I think we have reached -- I have tried to do this in an orderly fashion, but order takes time, and I do not want to take any more time to get to this.

So, back to where we were before. With respect to David Tkhilaishvili, we are dealing with a total Offense Level of 20, a Criminal History Category of X [phonetic]. That leads to a guideline range of 37 to 46 months, supervised release of 1 to 3 years, a fine of \$1,500 to \$150,000, restitution that I am setting at \$3,500. That is a little different from what Probation had outlined. And there is a Special Assessment of \$400, \$100 on each of the counts.

I assume we are dealing with the same set of numbers here; is that correct?

MS. KAPLAN: Yes, your Honor.

MR. CRUZ: Your Honor, I do agree, with the caveat that I will be arguing that the Court should depart to Category I for various reasons cited in the memo.

THE COURT: Right. But in terms of the literal terms of the guidelines, I take it there is not an objection about that?

MR. CRUZ: Correct.

1 THE COURT: And then, with respect to Jambulat Tkhilaishvili, we are dealing with a total Offense Level of 20, 2. a Criminal History Category of I. That leads to a guideline 3 4 range of 33 to 41 months' incarceration, 1 to 3 years of 5 supervised release, \$1,500 to \$150,000 in fine, and a Special 6 Assessment of \$200. Are we dealing with the same set of numbers? 7 MR. TUMPOSKY: That's correct, your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: Okay. So, Ms. Kaplan, I will hear you on 10 the Government's recommendation. 11 MS. KAPLAN: Oh. I thought I had made mine last time. 12 You want me to go through it again? 13 THE COURT: Yes, if you will, just because we have 14 been through several iterations of the issue. 15 MS. KAPLAN: Okay. Taking into account the sentencing 16 factors under 3553(a), your Honor, we believe -- and we are talking about David? 17 18 THE COURT: David first and then Jambulat. 19 MS. KAPLAN: Okay. With respect to David 20 Tkhilaishvili, we believe that -- the Government recommends a 21 sentence at the high end of the sentencing quideline range, and 22 we believe this is sufficient but not greater than necessary to 23 comply with the purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines. 24 THE COURT: Let me just ask --25 MS. KAPLAN: Yes.

THE COURT: -- you use "high end of the guidelines," rather than a particular number. I just don't know --

MS. KAPLAN: Forty-six months, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MS. KAPLAN: Looking at the nature and circumstances of the offense, there is no question that the crime of extortion is a serious offense. Your Honor, you presided over the trial and you heard about the defendant's conduct with respect to the victim in this case and the threats to harm him, his family, his business. You also heard about during the trial a threat -- well, I think it was during the trial -- a threat to kill one of the FBI Agents. The defendant made a decision to take the law into his own hands with respect to Allied Health and the victim in this case, and he should not have done that.

Looking at this particular defendant and his particular role in the offense, we believe that a sentence of 46 months is appropriate to address several specific concerns. First, the defendant threatened the victim's family members, and under Section 2B3.2 the Application Note says that if the offense involved a threat to a family member of the victim an upward departure may be warranted.

Secondly, immediately prior to the trial the defendant reached out --

THE COURT: But you are not asking me to make an

upward departure?

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MS. KAPLAN: No, no. But that would be one of the reasons for the Government seeking a high end of the guideline sentence.

Second, immediately prior to the trial the defendant reached out to a witness in the case in direct violation of the Court's Order not to have contact with any of the witnesses.

He paid this witness, which the Government views as an attempt to tamper with the witness or some sort of obstruction of justice.

Similarly, your Honor may recall that after that occurred and during the trial the defendant again disobeyed the Court's instructions and order not to have contact with any witness or person connected with the case, and he approached a person who had accompanied Mr. Torosyan to court and told him that Mr. Torosyan was a liar. This was yet another attempt to intimidate this individual as well as get a message to the individual in this case in direct contradiction of the Court's Order.

And, finally, as I mentioned, when the agents arrested the defendant, who had been in violation of the Court's Order, the defendant David Tkhilaishvili threatened to kill the FBI Agent.

This defendant clearly has no regard or respect for the law. The way he behaved before and during the trial

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demonstrates as much, and your Honor heard the tapes in this case where he says he has no respect for the law and indicated that he is above the law or believes he is above the law.

In the letters from the defendant's family they seem to be under the impression that this defendant funded Allied Health, when the evidence at trial was completely undisputed that Allied Health was completely funded by Victor Torosyan, and even in counsel's argument to the Court in the sentencing memo that they filed the defendant accused the victim of having taken his business, a business that was entirely funded by the victim.

The victim, as you may remember, was a man who had taken David Tkhilaishvili under his wing, had loaned him money, had treated him like a son, given him a ring to give to

Mr. Tkhilaishvili's fiancee, gave him gifts, and the defendant did nothing to thank him but stole all of his life savings and took loans from him that he never repaid. He then threatened to use physical violence to try and steal from him things that were not his, and he left the victim in this case, a man who came to this country with nothing and built up several successful businesses, a shattered man and caused him great emotional distress, not only to him, but, as you can see from the letter from Mr. Torosyan's wife, great physical distress to her as well. And he has shown no remorse even today. He is a con man. He uses people, and he takes things by threatening

people, things that are not his.

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The jury also heard from two other witnesses, your Honor, who were employees of Allied Health that the defendant got so angry at them he threw a table over, he went to hit Kendrick (ph) Fabrick. And on another occasion the witnesses reported that the defendant had hit the former girlfriend, Kristina, while at work while he was in a rage.

These are the reasons, your Honor, that the Government believes that a sentence at the high end of the guidelines range is appropriate, it's necessary, it will promote respect for the law, it will deter the defendant from engaging in further criminal conduct and tell him that he cannot take the law into his own hands, and that he cannot when he gets angry threaten to kill people and extort them. It will protect the public from further crimes of this defendant, and it will send a message that threats to cause physical harm cannot be used to settle business disputes, and such conduct will be prosecuted.

These are the reasons, your Honor, that the Government is seeking a sentence of 46 months, supervised release of 3 years, restitution in the amount of \$3,500 to the Allied Health, a Special Assessment of \$400, and a fine of \$1,500.

THE COURT: All right. Do you want to speak also to Jambulat as well?

MS. KAPLAN: Oh, sure. Again, with respect to the 3553(a) factors, the Government is seeking a sentence at the

1 high end of the guidelines range, which is 41 months. this is a crime that is extremely serious. 2. THE COURT: Can I just pause on that? 3 4 MS. KAPLAN: Yes. 5 THE COURT: This is a deportable crime, right? 6 MS. KAPLAN: I'm sorry? 7 THE COURT: Deportable crime? MS. KAPLAN: Yes. Yes, it is. 8 THE COURT: He will serve the time, and then the 9 10 assumption is that he will be deported? 11 MS. KAPLAN: I believe so. I believe so. 12 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 13 MS. KAPLAN: With respect to this particular defendant 14 and his role, in his Sentencing Memorandum Mr. Tkhilaishvili 15 tries to pin all of the responsibility on his younger brother, 16 who he claims he was just following. But short of actually 17 writing the checks to himself and embezzling the money from 18 Allied Health, this defendant was with his brother in lockstep 19 every step along the way of this conspiracy to extort Allied

brother was out of the country. He did that on his own, not at his brother's direction. Your Honor also heard at trial about threats that Jambulat Tkhilaishvili made to another witness, Olga, that if she wronged him he would cut her.

Health, including threatening to harm the victim, Victor

Torosyan. This defendant threatened Mr. Torosyan even when his

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Mr. Tkhilaishvili argued that his family needs him and depends on him, but he was not thinking of his family prior to entering into this conspiracy to extort Mr. Torosyan, and he has essentially ruined Mr. Torosyan's life needlessly.

We believe that a sentence of 41 months would promote respect for the law, it will deter the defendant from engaging in further criminal conduct, it will protect the public from further crimes of this defendant, and, again, it will send a message that threats to cause physical harm cannot be used to settle business disputes, and this type of conduct will be prosecuted. So, we are seeking a sentence of 41 months, supervised release of 3 years, a Special Assessment of \$200, and a fine of \$15,000.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. The period of supervised release is?

MS. KAPLAN: Of 3 years.

THE COURT: Three years. All right.

So, Mr. Cruz.

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MR. CRUZ: Your Honor, with regard to David
Tkhilaishvili, I am asking the Court to consider what is at
this point approximately 7 months and 11 days that he has been
held in custody since the conclusion of the trial. That, in
addition to time that he spent in custody prior to that
awaiting release on conditions, would equate to approximately
9 months or so at this point as a period of incarceration of

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time served, followed by a period of supervised release of 2 years, the first 6 months of which would be served in home confinement with electronic monitoring.

I suggest to the Court that this is the appropriate sentence, first of all, because, although there is an agreement with regard to the guideline calculation, I would suggest to the Court that the Criminal History Category that is imposed should more appropriately be a Category I as opposed to a Category II. The entirety of his criminal history is encapsulated in Paragraph 57 of the Presentence Report, which is one case charging multiple counts of Assault With a Dangerous Weapon. For that particular case the Probation Department awards him four total criminal history points, three of which are appointed under 4A1.1E. And an argument that I raise in my Sentencing Memorandum, your Honor, is that it is not an appropriate reading of that particular section of the Guidelines, because what the Sentencing Commission originally envisioned when amending that section of the Guidelines was that a person who had committed multiple offenses at different times could potentially receive a windfall if sentenced for all of those things on the same date.

In this particular case we don't have an incident or multiple incidents that are separated by time or intervening arrests. What we have is one case involving multiple counts in the same charging document for which he is being assessed four

1 Criminal History points. So, I am suggesting to the Court that is not what this section of the Guidelines was geared toward 2. addressing, and that the Court should depart to Category I 3 under the circumstances. This was a Continuance Without a 4 5 Finding that resulted ultimately in a dismissal and no jail 6 time. So, to say that he is a Category II under these 7 circumstances I would argue is somewhat overstated. If the Court were to agree that Category I applies, then the range 8 9 that would come to bear is 33 to 41 months, as opposed to 37 to 46 months. 10 11 THE COURT: That gets you closer to time served but 12 not much. 13 MR. CRUZ: Not much, your Honor, but I think that 14 there is something to be said for the floor being lowered 15 somewhat under the circumstances. 16 THE COURT: Well, what do I do with someone who is --17 we use the phrase "anger management." 18 MR. CRUZ: Well, your Honor --19 THE COURT: It is more than that. 20 MR. CRUZ: But I think --21 THE COURT: It is part of the way in which he did 22 business. 23 I think the Court has the hit the literal MR. CRUZ: 24 nail on the head with regard to the reference to 25 anger-management issues. This is a person -- and the Court has

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at length seen the testimony of Victor Torosyan, assessed him as a witness, et cetera, and other factors that the Court heard about at trial.

Also with regard to Mr. Tkhilaishvili, and as argued previously, these are two people that were very similar in terms of their personality. These are people who talked to each other in the ways that the Court heard and that the jury heard on that tape without incident prior to that. But at the heart of all of this is an argument over this business.

And the Government suggests that all of Mr. Torosyan's life savings were taken. The fact of the matter is that Mr. Torosyan is still operating that business, that he has opened a second business at another location and has plans to open other branches.

THE COURT: Not to be arch about it, but through no help of Tkhilaishvili. Is that the case?

MR. CRUZ: No, I understand, your Honor.

THE COURT: So, what we have is one person who undertook to use illegal activity to advance his own business interests and someone who, I suppose the argument is, could give as good as he took but did not, and ended up relatively better off than Mr. Tkhilaishvili but still not where he would have wanted to be.

MR. CRUZ: No, your Honor. And, granted, we can't get around the jury's finding in this case with regard to all of

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these counts, but I think that the Court has, again, hit on an important point, which is that Mr. Tkhilaishvili is someone whose actions I would argue can be mitigated to a certain extent, given the relationship that existed and, more importantly, given Mr. Torosyan's own actions during the course of the time that he is allegedly being threatened and that his family is being threatened. He continues to work with Mr. Tkhilaishvili and his brother through the end of 2015. This is months after these threats have allegedly been made. He appears with them at an opening party for the clinic, and he brings his family there with absolutely no fear, I would argue or suggest, of being harmed himself or having his family harmed. He allows Mr. Tkhilaishvili access to his home in Mashpee after he is threatened with bodily harm and his family is threatened.

So, I would suggest that there's some level of proof there that the Court can take in order to consider mitigation in this sentence, albeit there is a violation of the law that the jury found, but it is not to the extent or within the heartland, I would suggest, of what the Court would routinely see in a case like this, where acts of physical violence are proven by the Government or other factors come to bear that make this a much more serious situation, still a violation of the law, but a much more serious situation, and that's why I think the Court should consider to a certain extent departing

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from what the guidelines say, at least as I have described them.

In addition to that, your Honor, this is a man who has never spent a day in prison, and he has spent the last approximately 8 to 9 months in prison, and that has changed his view, as the Court as read in his statement. This is not activity or conduct that he wants to continue or repeat in the future. He understands the consequences that come from outbursts, if you will, because he is upset or because things aren't working out with regard to his business relationships, and the last thing that he wants to do is to continue to spend time in jail where he is arguably not receiving -- and I understand the Court has a view of what the Bureau of Prisons can offer in terms of medical treatment -- but he is not receiving adequate medical treatment with regard to his diabetes.

He is separated from his business, which is literally hanging on by a thread at this point. They've lost employees, although they're still open, and the business is being run to the extent possible by friends and/or his relatives who aren't in a position really to do this successfully, because they were never a part of it previously.

In addition to that, your Honor, his relationship with his fiancee is in jeopardy, because her fiancee visa would expire at the end of this year unless he continues with her in

this process.

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So, there is a lot on the line here in terms of consequences of an extended period of incarceration, not the least of which is his connection to his parents, who are here in court, who rely on both him and his brother to take them to medical appointments, to see to their well-being generally, to lend them support financially, and they're on their own literally at this point, getting by as well as they can, but they are devastated by this. And I understand that there's some blame to be cast here, but he doesn't want them in that position, he wants to help them.

And he wants the Court to know that it shouldn't worry about his continuing to do these things. This was a unique situation involving a relationship with Victor Torosyan. There is no evidence in his prior criminal history that he has been convicted or charged of anything like this in the past, and it is a result of his and other individuals' personalities.

He wants the Court to be just as I know it will with regard to sentencing, and he wants an opportunity to prove to the Court that everything that Ms. Kaplan stated about what happened pretrial -- and, your Honor, all of those things were dealt with either in front of the Magistrate Judge with regard to contacts with witnesses, those were all addressed in front of the Magistrate Judge and shown to be, albeit not proper use of judgment in paying an individual who he owed money to at

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that particular time, but the Magistrate Judge heard all of those things and still released him.

In addition to that, this issue of accusing him of wanting to kill an arresting agent, I believe that what the report said was he said, "God kill you," which, again, is part and parcel to what we have in this case, which is an emotional outburst with regard to a frustrating situation but not an actual attempt or desire to hurt anyone. So, all of these things can be addressed under these circumstances I have suggested to the Court.

Nine months is a long time for him, and it has been a long time, through which he has literally re-thought his personality and what he wants to do with his life while sitting in jail and its effects and its consequences on the rest of his life and the individuals whom he loves. And he wants an opportunity to prove to the Court that he can change his behavior, and that if there is any contact in the future -- or that there won't be any, I should suggest, any contact with Mr. Torosyan whatsoever. These are things the Court through the Probation Department can monitor and assure that no one is going to be in harm's way, and that he will do as he has promised or suggested that he won't repeat this behavior in the future. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Tkhilaishvili, I will hear from you, if there is

something you would like to say at this point.

2 MR. CRUZ: Your Honor, before Mr. Tumposky starts,
3 Mr. Tkhilaishvili just wanted me to refer to the letters that
4 were submitted on his behalf.

THE COURT: Yes. I have them, and I have been through them as well.

MR. CRUZ: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: But this is an opportunity for him to speak directly in open court, if he chooses to. He does not have to, but he has that opportunity.

MR. CRUZ: And he would rest on what has been submitted as a personal statement. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

So, Mr. Tumposky.

MR. TUMPOSKY: Yes, your Honor. On behalf of Jambulat Tkhilaishvili, I am also asking for a sentence of time served, which would be approximately 8 months between the time of the verdict to now and the pretrial detention, and I do that for several reasons.

Until 2015 Mr. Tkhilaishvili was living what some might describe as the classic American dream. He came here with very little. He worked hard in not very big jobs but sort of menial jobs, delivering pizzas, driving patients for a dentist's office. He was trying to do what he could to support his family, to make a living, to try and better his life, and

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this was the life that he lived from the time that he came here and until the time that he got involved with the clinic and with Mr. Torosyan.

He doesn't have any record of any criminal conduct before this. His conduct while he was on release was exemplary. This incident that he has been convicted of really stands out as aberrant in the life that he has led since he has been in the United States, your Honor. And so, the question is what should the Court do about what he was convicted of?

Now, the Government says in their presentation these two, they were all in it together, there's no difference between Jambulat and David. The Court sat through the testimony at trial, and I would suggest that's simply not the case; that, in fact, Jambulat Tkhilaishvili was not there every step of the way with his brother. He really had no involvement in the business at all, quite frankly, and stood to gain nothing, the evidence showed at trial. Even if the extortion had been successful he stood to gain nothing. He did not take a single dollar in money from that business. He didn't even work there. He was still working at the pizza place while others were running the clinic. And so, this notion that he was an equal and alongside David every step of the way is simply untrue.

So, I think the Court should take that into account, understanding, yes, he has been convicted of two serious

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crimes, and I say "serious" in that the allegations in any federal crime is serious. But I think I have to point out, your Honor, that if Mr. Torosyan had gone to the Quincy Police Department instead of his civil lawyers or the FBI, that the sentence these two would be facing would be far different, and he could have very easily gone in this direction as a state or local offense, rather than a federal offense. He'd probably get 6 months of probation with someone with his record and where there was no actual physical injury to the victim, and I think the Court should take that into account as well.

He has his wife that he supports, her child. His parents who are here, they are elderly, he supports them as well, or at least he was while he was out.

And, as the Court noted, there is a possibility of deportation in this case, but it isn't certain. It isn't certain. And so, the sentence that the Court gives will actually have an impact on that. So, the question I think the Court might want to ask itself is, yes, he has done something wrong, but has he forfeited his right to be here forever? Has he forfeited his right to live with his wife, to support his parents and to support his wife's child forever?

And so, I'm asking for a sentence of time served because I think it's appropriate, given his prior record, his conduct on release, which is exemplary, his relative involvement in the criminal case, and his family and what he

has tried to do positively, as the letters indicate, for his
family.

Now, I also want to give an alternative to the Court, if the Court feels that a sentence of time served isn't sufficient, and that is a sentence of 11 months on Count One and up to 11 months on Count Two. A sentence of 11 months on either count, either concurrent or consecutive, would potentially, potentially protect his right to remain in the United States. If the Court gives him more that than that, his deportation is almost certain.

And so, I would ask the Court to consider a sentence of time served or, alternatively, 11 months on Count One and 11 months, if necessary, on Count Two to run on and after, if the Court truly believes that a longer sentence is necessary, give him the opportunity, however slim it might be, when he gets out to remain in the United States, continue to work hard, as he was doing before, continue to support his wife and her child, and continue to support his elderly parents. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Again, I will hear from Mr. Tkhilaishvili, if he wants to speak at this point.

MR. TUMPOSKY: He'll rest on the letter that he submitted, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I guess I will start with the larger question here, which is the potential for disparity between federal embezzlement and state embezzlement.

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The Congress made a choice to include this kind of activity in the Hobbs Act and it was, I think, a considered choice, that there are certain kinds of activity that, because of their effect on interstate commerce and their character, are ones that require the attention of the Federal Government. I am putting to one side the question now of health care violations.

It is a serious offense. It is at the same time at the crossroads of federalism, and so I do want to be sensitive to how this would be treated in the State Court as opposed to in the Federal Court, not because I think there is parity, but to be sure that, as a cross-check, I understand the seriousness of the offense and the choice to have it here as opposed to elsewhere.

But I start, then, with the idea of the seriousness of the offense. I think it is a very serious offense. In the case of David Tkhilaishvili it is compounded by interference with a kind of business that is servicing the most vulnerable and ought to be handled with great integrity. It was not. That does not appear to be his modus operandi. Rather, it is a choice to engage in business in a manner that is suffused with threats of violence, which I discount to some degree as cultural, but not entirely.

This is heartland Hobbs Act extortion, as far as I am concerned. Congress meant it. It is my obligation to deal with it in that fashion.

I look at the character of the defendant, and, while I do not see here the long-range criminal activity, I do not view the previous conviction, which I will assimilate as one item intellectually as opposed to how the guidelines are treated, as being aberrant nor this being aberrant. This is an individual who chooses to conduct his affairs with others, no matter how he conducts his affairs with his family, with others in a threatening fashion, who feels no particular obligation to comply with the law, no particular obligation to comply with rules that are established by the Court, and, frankly, offers a pretextual explanation for why he cannot bring himself to comply.

In short, I find here nothing that would cause me to mitigate the application of the guidelines as a framework having to do with the nature and characteristics of the defendant.

Mr. Cruz makes the point that the defendant has never spent much time in jail. Well, that is not a way to stay out of jail; that is simply a way of saying that perhaps things have not become as clear to him as they should have. I have considerable concern as a matter of specific deterrence regarding this individual's enlargement prematurely. It is, it seems to me, very important for this defendant to understand that the costs of engaging in activity like this, even with someone who responds in a somewhat aggressive fashion himself

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but not with violence or threats of violence, cannot be countenanced, and the consequences will be severe. That is what the guidelines here speak to, and they seem to me to be appropriate.

I also look in terms of general deterrence. There is a kind of subtext here that this is cultural, that this is just the way people talk, the way they relate kind of aggressiveness. I do not really buy that. What I see here is an unwillingness to accept conventions of business activity that it is very important for this country to uphold and not to give some special discount to someone who cannot comply with those conventions.

I would not like to leave it as a matter of general deterrence that this is the kind of thing to be winked at, or ignored, or treated as if it does not belong in the Federal Court.

I am aware of considerations having to do with the prison system, a claim of difficulties in medical care. Of course, I have considered that, although, as Mr. Cruz indicated, I have also come to the conclusion that the medical conditions that the defendant complains of are ones that the Bureau of Prisons can deal with effectively and does on a daily basis.

I have also looked at the question of disparity. I have some sense of the range of sentences for offenses like

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this. I think the guidelines are a bit high for ultimately unexecuted threats in this area, and, consequently, I am going to vary from the guidelines themselves. I am going to impose a sentence of 36 months' incarceration. I will impose a period of 3 years of supervised release. I am going to impose a \$3,500 restitution figure.

I will not impose a fine under these circumstances. It seems to me that, given the interrelationship of family and family needs, that taking a fine as well would be further inflicting harm on family members who were not complicit in this criminal activity. I emphasize what I think we all understand, which is to say that there are multiple victims, including victims like his parents, but those are people who were the collateral damage created by his activity for which he is responsible, and, while some mitigation is appropriate in the sentence, that is, to speak specifically to the fine, it seems to me that the family members who were not directly involved cannot be held hostage to the defendant's misconduct.

There will be a forfeiture order, money judgment forfeiture order entered as well. And there must be a Special Assessment of \$400 imposed.

There are the customary mandatory conditions of supervision: that the defendant not commit another federal, state or local crime, that he not unlawfully possess a controlled substance, that he refrain from any unlawful use of

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a controlled substance, and I will require that he submit to one drug test within 15 days of his release from prison and for as many as 104 drug tests per year by Probation. This is not someone who has a history of drug problems. On the other hand, this is a person who has a demonstrated inability to conform his lifestyle to matters that can be productive and who could well, in my estimation, find himself leading into drug use.

And so, I mean to have the Probation Office supervise that as they see fit within that range.

There is an obligation that he cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the Probation Office.

In addition to the standard conditions of supervised release, I am going to require him to participate in a drug treatment program. There is a certain irony involved here that he chose to exploit the drug difficulties of vulnerable people. It seems to me important for him to understand with some particularity who those people are by participation in a drug treatment program.

He is obligated to pay the balance of restitution and the money judgment immediately, but if he cannot pay it immediately, then according to a Court-ordered repayment schedule.

He is prohibited from incurring any new credit charges or opening additional lines of credit without the approval of the Probation Office while any financial obligations are

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outstanding. He is obligated, while those financial obligations are outstanding, to provide any requested financial information to the Probation Office, and that may be shared with the United States Attorney's Office Financial Litigation Unit.

He is specifically required not to knowingly have any contact, direct or indirect, with Mr. Torosyan and his immediate family.

Turning, then, to Jambulat Tkhilaishvili, I accept the argument that Mr. Tumposky has made that there is a disparity in the involvement here and that he is not at the core of creating this business environment that his brother, David, did that falls within the heartland, as far as I am concerned, of Hobbs Act extortion. That having been said, this is serious business, and he lent himself to the larger purposes of extortion here, the effort to suffuse the atmosphere with threat, lest the business be conducted in a way that, improperly, he and his brother wanted to have it conducted.

I am going to impose a sentence of 18 months' incarceration here on Jambulat Tkhilaishvili. Mr. Tumposky tells me it makes a difference what the length of particular sentences are. I don't know that, but what I will do is make it 9 months on Count One, 9 months on Count Two. They are consecutive. If that makes a difference, that is a matter for the immigration authorities. But that is meant, 18 months in

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aggregate, to reflect the seriousness of the offense here.

In terms of personal characteristics, I buy much of what Mr. Tumposky has said here, a hard-working man attempting to deal with a series of family dimensions that are challenging. But he did not simply allow himself to be drawn in. He lent himself to this activity, and that, it seems to me, is something that overcomes the particular problems or family issues that are created by that.

The question of specific deterrence I think is adequately addressed by the 18-month sentence here for Jambulat Tkhilaishvili. It seems to me that he has a greater sense of remorse than his brother does, and it was demonstrated to me by observation throughout. But there is a general deterrence that, it may be your brother, but you do not help him out in Hobbs Act extortion, and others who are facing that sort of thing should understand that there are consequences for a choice that does help out a brother by lending yourself to Hobbs Act extortion, and others who are faced with that sort of thing must address it, and to understand that there is no cultural-difference discount that is appropriate for this kind of conduct, this kind of threat.

I have looked at the question of jail, prison, to see whether it should inflect my judgment here. It does not. It seems to me to be a neutral factor here. I do recur to my understanding of the range of sentences that are imposed for

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non-executed threat cases that are Hobbs Act cases. This seems to me to be a not-disparate sentence for someone in the position of Mr. Jambulat Tkhilaishvili.

The short of it is that this is a serious offense in the Federal Court. It is not the most serious, but it is a serious offense, not the most serious of Hobbs Act cases, but it is a serious offense, and it cannot go without substantial consequence. The substantial consequence that I have imposed is in both cases a departure from the guidelines themselves, which seem to me to be, for these circumstances, a little bit severe, more than a little bit severe. This sentence is tailored to try to deal with that issue.

Now, turning to the specifics of supervised release for Jambulat Tkhilaishvili, I am going to impose 3 years of supervised release upon him as well. It is very important that he be subject to the supervision of the Court if he is not deported in this case. The question of whether he will be deported is, of course, an open question.

He is obligated to pay a Special Assessment of \$200.

I will not impose a fine under these circumstances.

Why do I use 3 years of supervised release? Well, because if he gets involved in this kind of thing again in any way, he should understand that he is subject to further consequences. He has to conform himself here.

Part of this, of course, is the standard conditions of

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supervised release, the mandatory ones, that he not engage in another federal, state or local crime, and that he not possess a controlled substance. I see no reason to impose drug testing on him at this time, apart from the obligation to submit to one drug test within 15 days of release and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter. If there appears to be some sort of problem, Probation will bring it to my attention.

He is obligated to cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample, as directed by the Probation Office.

The standard conditions are those that are set forth in the *Guidelines*. I will not rehearse them again here, but there is a special condition, because of his vulnerable immigration status, and that is that if he is ordered deported he is obligated to leave the United States and not to return without the prior permission of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. He is obligated to use his true name, and he is prohibited from the use of any false identifying information, and that includes but it is not limited to any aliases, or false dates of birth, or false Social Security numbers, or incorrect places of birth.

He is, of course, obligated to pay a Special Assessment of \$200. That is due immediately. I suspect that it will be handled through a prison financial-responsibility program, so I make no further conditions with respect to that.

I think I have been as clear as I can about my view of

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the seriousness of this offense. It is not something to be ignored, not something to be sloughed off by letters to the Court indicating that the defendant has seen the light in particular ways. I have no doubt that the experience of being in custody here has been eye-opening for the defendants, but the amount of time in custody should reflect the seriousness of offense. This set of sentences I think does that.

Both of the defendants should be aware that they have a right of appeal. They will want to consult counsel with respect to that. There has already been an indication, of course, that that is possible or likely.

Now, are there any other conditions that the parties or Probation would ask me to consider?

THE PROBATION OFFICER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Kaplan, anything?

MS. KAPLAN: No, your Honor.

MR. CRUZ: Your Honor, I would just ask the Court to consider making a recommendation on Mr. Tkhilaishvili's judgment that he be designated by the Bureau of Prisons to FMC Devens, if at all possible. It would serve two purposes, including having his family accessible and dealing with his medical issues.

THE COURT: I think I will make the recommendation with respect to Devens. It is, as you know, a recommendation. They are not required to follow it. But the recommendation

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      will be Fort Devens or such other facility that can attend to
      his medical needs and as close as possible to his parents.
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               MR. CRUZ: Thank you, your Honor.
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               MR. TUMPOSKY: And I would ask for a recommendation
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      that he be assigned as close as possible to the Boston area,
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      which I think would be Berlin or Danbury.
               THE COURT: I will make that. I am not going to make
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      a Devens recommendation for him.
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               MR. TUMPOSKY: No.
               THE COURT: But I will make the general area.
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               MR. TUMPOSKY:
                              Thank you.
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               THE COURT: Is there anything further that we need to
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      take up?
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               MS. KAPLAN: No, your Honor.
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               MR. CRUZ: No, thank you.
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               THE COURT: All right. Then, we will be in recess.
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      Thank you.
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               THE CLERK: All rise.
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           (The Honorable Court exited the courtroom at 11:23 a.m.)
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             (WHEREUPON, the proceedings adjourned at 11:23 a.m.)
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I, Brenda K. Hancock, RMR, CRR and Official Court
Reporter of the United States District Court, do hereby certify
that the foregoing transcript constitutes, to the best of my
skill and ability, a true and accurate transcription of my
stenotype notes taken in the matter of *United State of America*v. Tkhilaishvili, et al., No. 1:16-cr-10134-DPW.

Date: 04/30/18 // Bi

/s/ Brenda K. Hancock
Brenda K. Hancock, RMR, CRR
Official Court Reporter